Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Gretchen G. Leininger v. Board Of Review of the Industrial
Commission Of Utah : Brief For The Plaintiff-Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Donovan C. Snyder; Attorneys for Defendant Rose K.
Georgas
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kennecott v. Utah Indus. Comm'n, No. 19036 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4589

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GRETCHEN G. LEININGER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

No. 19048

vs.

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendants/Appellees.:

BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW,
DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Gretchen G. Leininger
Plaintiff
1551 East 4160 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Floyd G. As tin
K. Allan Zabel
Special Assistant Attorneys General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
of Employment Security
1234 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

F:lt.:ED

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GRETCHEN G.
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Clo. 19048

vs.

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendants/Appellees.:
BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW,
DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Gretchen G. Leininger
Plaintiff
1551 East 4160 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Floyd G. Astin
K. Allan Zabe 1
Special Assistant Attorneys General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
1234 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Nature of the Case

1

Relief South on Appeal

1

The Facts of the Case

1

l.,.c;ues on Appeal

2

Argument

3

POINT I

THE BOARD ERRED
APPLYING AN
IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT
GRETCHEN WAS INELIGIBLE . . .

POINT II THE DECISION OF THE BOARD IS
UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL,
COMPETENT EVIDENCE
Conclusion and Relief Sought . . . .

3

9

12

CASES CITED
Annotation, 31 A.L.R.3d 891, 939-43

9

Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review,
568 P.Zd 727 (Utah 1977) . . . . .

5

Davoren v. Iowa Employment Security Comm'n.,
277 N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1979) . . . . . . .

9

Glict v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 591 P.2d
24 (Cal. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Idaho Dezt. of Employment v. Smith, 434 u.s.
100 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Norton v. Dept. of Employment Security, 447 P.2d
907 (Utah 1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

De t. of Human
Or . Ct . App . 9 7 8)

9

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Employment
Security, 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982
...

4, 5

Schultz v. Board of Review, 606 P.2d 254 (Utah 1980)

. 6, 7, 10

T0wnsend v. Board of Review, 493 P.2d 614 (Utah 1972

• 6, 7

Jorddn v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982)
v. Commw. Unem lo ment Com . Bd.,
401 A.2d 8
Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979

4, 5

9

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. ,

35-4-5 (1982 Supp.)

3, 4,

s,

6, 8, 9

11.C.A.

35-4-4

4, 5, 6, 9

r:.A.

15-1+-3

4

of Adjudication of the Board of Review,
Rule 30, Able and Available . . . • . . •

rZules

7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
G. LEININGER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

No. 19048

'1S.

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE

LWUSTRIAL COMMISSION

OF UTAH,

Defendants/Appellees.:

BRIEF FOR THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Board of
of the Industrial Commission.

The Board affirmed the

termination of unemployment benefits for the plaintiff/
arpellant, Gretchen Leininger, because she attended two classes
at the University of Utah.

RELIEF SOUGHT
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board,
an order to pay the benefits withheld, and reimbursement of the
costs of this appeal.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE
Grethcen Leininger was emploved as a nurse at St. Marks
lt·•spit'll in Salt Lake l'ity from July l, 1975, to January lQ,
1

l:J2.

On Februarv 5, 1982, she applied for and eventually
receiving unemplovment compensation.

Having been

unsuccessful in obtaining emplovment, Gretchen enrnl lerl 'n
University of Utah during the Fall,

quarter.

She nttPnrlPl

two classes, five days a week, from 11:00

to 1 :nn

She was classified as a part-time student.

1-ler cnnt inue·l

efforts to become reemployed bore fruit when she ohtairwd
full-time work as a nurse on November 29, 1982.

She contirn1pcl

to work full time and attend classes part time through the
Spring, 1983 quarter at the University.

Tne benefits at issue

are those that she should have received between September 21)
and November 29, 1982.
The Department of Economic Security terminated Gretchen's
unemployment compensation retroactively to September 21), lQ.'l?,
because of her attendance at school.

She appealed the

termination to the appeals referee, who affirmed.
82-A-4601 (Novem'Jer 9, 1982) (R. 30).

Case No.

The Board of Review

remanded for further factfinding on the impact of school
attendance on work opportunities.
28, 1982) (R.21).

Decision No. 82-BR-521) (Dec.

On appeal from hearing on remand (R.12-lR),

the Board of Review affirmed the denial of compensation to
Gretchen.

Decision 82-BR-526 Review (February 9, 198'3)

(l{.7).

ISSUES ON APPF,AL
1.

Did the Board erroneously interpret U.(.A.

as requiring an irrebuttable presumption that all students
not able and available for work, and are
categorically ineligible for unemplovment

-2-

qr2

2.

Was the decision of the Board arbitrary, capricious,

dnd unsupported by substantial competent evidence?
ARGUMENT

P0INT I
THE BOARD ERRED IN APPLYING AN IRREBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION THAT GRETCHEN WAS INELIGIBLE
The second decision of the Board of Review denied
unemployment compensation to Gretchen because she was
(1) registered at and attending an established school,

(Z) did

'10t earn the major portion of her base period wages while
attending school, and (3) is not attending school under
Commission approval.
1983) (R.7).

Decision 82-BR-526 Review (February 9,

In so doing, the Board adopted the findings of

fact and conclusions of law of the appeals referee.

The

appeals referee refused to consider evidence that Gretchen was
able and available for work.

He helci that "an individual must

first meet the eligibility requirements of Section

to

receive benefits while attending [school] before the matter of
qvailability for work becomes a consideration.

The claimant

does not meet any of the exclusionary provisions of Section
35-4-S(g).

TI1erefore, the Representative's denial of i,enefits

i.3 held to have been i'1 order."

Decision of Appeals Referee,

cb. 82-A-4601 (Nov. 9, 1982) (R.30).
It was error to interpret U . . A.
h

L·equiring the cdt2gurical

35-4-5 (g)

(1 '182 Supp.)

>f all students from

fur unemployment compensation.

-3-

In essence, that

applies an irrebuttable or conclusive presu".lpt:i<rn t'wt 11 l
students are not availble for work, as requirerl hv

§ 35-4-4(c).

In reviewing questions of st1tut,nv Cl)nstn1ct'nn,

judicial review is "plenary with no deference A.ccorjed the
administrative determination."

Salt Lake Ci.tv Corp. v. flept:.

of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312, l31S (Utah 1982).

The

better interpretation is that § 35-4-5(g) is a
presumption of unavailability for work, which can be disproved
in a particular case with a showing by the student claimant
that she was, in fact, primarily a member of the work force anrl
secondarily a student.
The fundamental role of the court in construing statutes is
to give effect the underlying intent of the legislature.
Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).

West

Sections

35-4-5 and 35-4-4 are completely separate sections, with no
express legislative bridge between them.

To give effect only

to the disqualifying factors in § 35-4-5, without making any
effort to balance them with the competing interests of the
eligibility factors in § 35-4-4, is to write
the code.

35-4-4 out of

Section 35-4-4 unequivocally establishes

eligibility.

Section 35-4-3 unequivocally states that

persons shall receive benefits.

Section 35-4-5 is equallv

unequivocal that certain factors render a claimant
for benefits.

The statute does not expresslv state which

section controls in the event of a conflict.
Rather than ignore proof that a person is eligible unrler

-4-

35-4-4, the better view is to balance the competing interests
,,,,,Jerlying both sections.

This can be accomplished by

interpreting § 35-4-5(g) as a rebuttable presumption.
•ay, effect can be given to both sections.

In this

This is one

instance where a too literal interpretation of a statute
creates a result that is "unreasonably confused, inoperable,
[and] in blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the
statute.

II

West Jordan v.

656 P.2d at 446.

The unemployment compensation statute is to be
. . liberally construed and administered to assist those who
are attached to the work force and need a bridge between
jobs."

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Dept. of Emplovment Security,

657 P.2d at 1315.

Consistent with the ameliorative purpose of

the Act, § 35-4-5 is to be strictly construed as a forfeiture
statute.
[A] statute for a forfeiture shouli be strictly
construed, and an ambiguous or doubtful term
should be given a construction which is least
likely to work a forfeiture.
The penal character
of the provision should be minimized by
excluding, rather than including, conduct not
clearly intended to be within the provision.
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review, 568

727, 730 (Utah

1977).
The ambiguity of the statute arises when trying to
:-econcile the ph::ases "able to work and is available for work,"
1

35-4-4(c). and "is registered at and attending an established

school,"§ 35-4-5(g).

Did the legislature intend to

exclude each and every student, and include each

-5-

and every person who is able and available to
time?

at the same

The statute should be applied in light of reality.

There has been a noticeable change in the tvpes of sturlents an,I
educational courses available today.

There has also been a

sharp increase in the number of "nontrarlitional sturlents," sue'<
as Gretchen, at today's colleges.

A literal interpretation of

§ 35-4-S(g) would exclude all full-time, part-time, dav, and
night students.

Those attending weekend outdoor recreation

classes, correspondence study, continuing education, or even
religious instruction classes at their church would be
excluded.

This would result even though they are otherwise

eligible under§ 35-4-4(c).
This court has unfortunately not taken an entirely
consistent position in interpreting§ 35-4-5(g).

In Norton v.

Dept. of Employment Securitv, 447 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968),

§ 35-4-5(g) was applied as a per se, categorical exclusion of
students from eligibility.

No effort was made to analyze or

implement the purpose of the statute.

Townsend v. Eoarrl of

Review, 493 P.2d 614 (Utah 1972), took a more reasonerl approach
to the problem.
identified as:

The policies behind § 35-4-S(g) were
(1) the legislative presumption that sturlents

are not available for

and (2) to prevent the use of

unemployment compensation as a subsidy for qn education.

In

Schultz v. Board of Review, 606 P.7d ?.S4 (Urah

§ 35-4-5(g) was not argued or consirlered, the rlecision resterl
entirely on whether the cippel lant in thA.t ccise '1arl proven he
-')-

was able and available for work as defined in§ 35-4-4(c).
T'1e General Rules of Adjudication for the Board of Review
1dupt
i\ule

the position c)f the plaintiff/appellant in this case.
30, Able and Available, provides:
The important factor to bear in mind is the
evidence of school attendance and work history
must clearly demonstrate that the claimant is
primarily a member of the work force and only
secondarily a student.
Whenever a claimant begins school attendance
after becoming unemployed, he/she is under the
same obligation to show that the hours of school
attendance would not require any rearrangement of
his/her regular working hours in order to
accommodate the school attenriance.

Tnis requires a case by case analysis of circumstances to
determine whether the student is eligible as being primarily
attached to the work force.
Townsend and Schultz.

This view is consistent with

The Board nevertheless changed its

position after remand and applied a conclusive presumption.
T'1e priiilary focus must be on availability for work.

1'1

Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977), an
Idaho student exemption was upheld against an equal protection
cl1allenge.

The Court held that the presumption that full-time

Jay students are unavailable for work, and generally not
lcJoking, ryro11ided a ;:-:ational oasis for exclu<ling them from
unemployment benefits.

However, if the

of

l:ireaks free ,Jf consider:-'ltions >bout availahility
f," wcJrk,

[;

the rcit·Lln.d basis is gonG anri the per se exclusion
ta constitutionil challenge.

In other words, if

1navailability and lack of desire to work are not the basis for

-7-

excluding students, then the supporting rational hasis is gnne
and the provision violates guarantees of equal rrotectinn.
A literal interpretation of the Utah stA.tute 1-101Ild swePp
far more broadly than the Idaho statute that was uphel1.

TherP

is no rational basis for excluding those who take one ur two
classes in such a way as to not interfere with potential
employment opportunities.

'Ibe exclusion would be hased solelv

on one's status as a student rather than one who had removed
herself from the work force.
not coextensive.

Tne two classes of unemployed are

Some unemployed are therefore being penalized

for doing an act that is not adverse to either cornmunitv morals
or values or the interests of the former employer.
'Ibe student class of ineligible unemployed is treated
differently from other classes of ineligibles listed in

§ 35-4-5.

With other ineligibles, once a prima facie case for

ineligibility is estabished, there is opportunity to rehut that
finding with appropriate evidence.

Rut once a prima facie case

of school attendance is established, there is no further
opportunity to prove eligibility.

Students are therefore the

only group of unemployed who have no opportunity to prove
extenuating circumstances or facts tending to prove cnntinued
eligibility.
treatment.

'Ibere is no rational 'Jasis for such disparqte
'Ibe conclusive presumption therefore violates equal

protection guarantees.
Al lowing Gretchen the opportunitv to overcn,ne the
presumption of unavailability and prove that she was

-S-

employment will not subvert legislative intent.
will instead effectuate it.

It

Virtually all states apply only a

rebuttable presumption that can be overcome with proof.
Although the student rarely succeeds, they at least have an
opportunity to offer their proof.

See, Petro v. Employment

Division, Dept. of Human Resources, 573 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App.
1978); Glict v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 591 P.2d 24
(Cal. 1979); Davoren v. Iowa Employment Security Comrn'n., 277
N.W.2d 602 (Iowa 1979); Zukauskas v. Comrnw. Unemployment Comp.
401 A.2d 866 (Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 1979); Annotation, 31
A.L.R.3d 891, 939-43.

By refusing to consider evidence that

Gretchen was eligible under § 35-4-4, the Commission committed
legal error.

The statute requires only a rebuttable

presumption that can be overcome with proof of full eligibility.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD IS UNSUPPORTED BY
COMP£TENT EVIDENCE
The Board simply refused to consider whether Gretchen was
eligible because of its erroneous interpretation of

§ 35-4-5(g).

Ynere were therefore no findings of fact on the

issue of eligibility under § 35-4-4, so the decision is
unsupported by eviJence and must be reversed.
However, Gretchen offered substantial evidence that she was
and available for work,§ 35-4-4(c), and therefore eligible

unavailahility was conclusively rebutted when she testified
-')-

that she did obtain full-time employment as a nurse whlle ln
school, and that neither her academic or wor\ performance
suffered.

(R.13, 16-17).

She reduced her school load hecause

it was interfering with her work, thus indicating a primarv
dedication to her work (R.16-17).

Her search for employment

did not abate because of school (R.15).

a nurse, a 24-hour

profession, she was available for work during the commonly
accepted working hours of the profession.

Cf. Schultz v. Bd.

of Review, 606 P.2d 254 (Utah 1980).
On the facts of this case, Gretchen does not deserve to be
penalized for attending two college classes.
unemployed for more than nine months.

She had been

There is no evidence

that she was anything other than diligent and earnest in her
search for new employment.

She suffered the additional

handicap of being older than the new nursing graduates against
whom she was competing for work.

It is only natural that an

active, intelligent mind would seek intellectual challenges
while continuing her search for work.
Our colleges, universities, and other
longer strictly classical academic institutions.

schools are no
Tl-trough

expanded and varied course offerings, they reach out to attract
and enrich all members of society.
cultural and social centers.

Schools are communitv

Perhaps no segment of our societv

more earnestly needs to participate, to socialize, and tn he
motivated through challenge than the unemploved.

The

unemployed are isolated and more easily discourqged than their
-10-

employed peers.
1

l

i•)\,·

If they can attend school part time and not

it tu interfere with a diligent and good faith search for

,.irk, there is no reason to penalize their initiative.

The

unemployed who prefer to spend their off-hours watching
television do not suffer such a penalty.
Tne Bord may emphasize the fact that Gretchen's ultimate
goal was to change her career.

Tnat fact is irrelevant because

the Board's decision was based entirely on her status as a
student.

It didn't matter whether she was enrolled in Russian

or a canoeing class.

That issue is now moot anyway.

Gretchen

is continuing her education on her own time and with her own
money.

There is no evidence that she is or ever was using

unemployment compensation to finance an education.
There was ample evidence of Gretchen's willingness and
desire to work.

Of critical importance was that she was

attending school only part time and arranged her class schedule
around her job.

Also important is the fact that she is a nurse

and doesn't face the 9 to 5 restraint in hours that many other
?rofessions do.

In short, her schedule is merely the reverse

of the person who works days and goes to school nights.
school apparently does not disqualify one from receiving
unemployment compensation (R.37-38).

There is no just reason

to penalize a person because their profession provides equal
1

pportunity for dav or ni3ht work .

Either way, Gretchen was

.ivai lab le for the same number of working hours.

TI1e

evidence proves that Gretchen was eligible
-11-

for her benefits.
CONCLUSION &.'lD RELIEF SOUGHT
The Board erred in changing its position in the mi-ist of
Gretchen's appeal and applying an irrebuttable presumption thAt
she was ineligible for unemployment compensation hecause of her
status as a student.

The great weight of the evidence that was

ignored proves that she was primarily looking and available for
work, and only secondarily a student.

The decision of the

Board must be reversed and remanded with an order to pay
Gretchen the unemployment compensation benefits she was
eligible to receive from September 26 to November 29, 1982, and
the costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1983.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that a true and exact copy of this brief was hand
delivered to Floyd G. Astin and K. Allan Zabel at their offices
at 1234 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101.
this

Done

day of June, 1983.
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August 25, 1983
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk, IJtah Supreme Court
IJtah State Supreme Court
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

\'/r1l\er T

OF UTAH

., en

FILED

L0-11cf' L r; l'I

Case No. 19048, Leininger v. Board of Review

Dear Mr. Butler:
As Counsel for the Respondent, Board of Review, in the abovereferenced case, I hereby respectfully waive Respondent's right to submit
a Response Brief and request that the Court decide this matter on the
rrcord, Appellant's Brief and this letter, and that such decision be expedited pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i), U.C.A. 1953.
This request is made after a careful and thorough review of the
record in the above-entitled matter and discussion with the members of the
Board of Review.
The General Rules of Adjudication, Able and Available,_
Section 40, quoted at R.0021-0022, provides that one 1vho is unemployed may
begin school attendance and still qualify for unemployment benefits pro=
vi ded that the hours of school attendance do not require any rearrangement
of his/her regular working hours.
In applying this Rule of Adjudication it
appears that the pertinent facts in this case are that the claimant worked
one and one-half years on the 3 p.m. to ll p.m. shift, prior to her separation from ernploy1nent; that her school attendance 1vas from ll a.m. to 1 p.m.,
conimencing September 28, 1982; that on November 29, 1982, the claimant began
working for the University Hospital as a Registered Nurse from 3 p.m. to
ll p.m.; that in January 1983 the claimant reduced her school hours because
of an extra heavy workload.
It is my opinion, and the Board of Review has concurred, that the
evidence of record in this matter more clearly supports the claimant's position that she is entitled to benefits and that the decision of the Board of
Review is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we request that
the Court enter an order reversing the decision of the Board of Review and
allowing benefits to the claimant for the period beginning September 26, 1982
It is requested that the Court expedite its
and ending November 28, 1982.
Order so that henefits may be paid to the claimant as early as possible to
avoirl any further delays in this matter.
Very truly yours,
K. All an Zaber
Legal .Counsel
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Gretchen G. Leininger
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